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Abstracts 
The primary aim of  this paper to evaluate the cost of deposit insurance premium and 
assess moral hazard effect in the banking sector in Sudan. The analysis of moral hazard 
in this paper is based on two types of risks, credit default risk, measured as the ratio of 
non-performing loans to the total size of loans for each bank, and operational risk 
measured as technical inefficiency. The findings of the research indicate there is a 
positive association between insurance coverage premium and increase in each of these 
two risks, implying evidence of moral hazard effect. A policy implication of this result is 
that the moral hazard behavior in the banking sector can be mitigated by changing the 
current policy of flat rate deposit insurance premium to risk based insurance premium 
policy. 
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1- Introduction: 
Due to recurring global financial crisis during the past fifteen years, deposit insurance 
system attracted increasing attention of policy makers in developing and developed 
countries. As a result in the past decade increasing number of countries around the globe 
have  adopted deposit insurance system as part of  their financial safety network. 
Countries that adopt explicit insurance make decisions about which class of deposits to 
insure, and up to what amount, which banks should participate in the insurance, and at 
what levels insurance premiums should  be set, and how to manage the deposit insurance 
fund (table 1). Explicit deposit insurance is a response to the increasing problem of 
banks run and contagion.  Banks are susceptible  to contagion because they borrow short 
by accepting  demand deposits and lend long by extending loans with longer maturities. 
If depositors decide to withdraw  more cash than the bank has in the vault, the bank may 
not be able to liquidate its assets fast enough to satisfy  deposit demands, and as a result 
a bank run can be prompted. Deposit insurance aims to assure depositors that if their 
banks fail for any reason, their funds will be protected up to the limits on coverage. 
Unless a bank can preserve liquidity, it may find itself forced to sell off its assets at low 
prices or close its doors. But with presence of deposit insurance , the  psychology of  a 
bank failure can be mitigated as depositors feel protected by the insurance system. 
However, deposit insurance system is not without costs, as it may encourage banks to 
take extra risks as a result of insurance protection, or what is called moral hazard 
problem. 
This paper aim to assess the pricing of deposit insurance in a sub-Saharan African 
country that adopted the system of deposit insurance  in the past few years. The 
academic basis for pricing deposit insurance  goes back to Merton (1977) who modeled 
deposit insurance as a put option on the value of a bank’s assets. Deposit insurance is 
considered over-priced ( under-priced) if the deposit insurer actually charges  more 
(less) for its insurance service  than the cost of these services. 
This paper aims to extend the empirical literature in two ways: First, the existing 
empirical evidence on deposit insurance pricing tend to focus on banks in developed 
countries whose banking system at widely different stages of liberalization and 
sophistication. There is a limited evidence of deposit insurance pricing in developing 
countries. Second, the Islamic banking system is distinct from conventional banking 
system, as a result, risk taking in such environment is different. This paper aims to fill 
part of this void by taking banking system of different environment and at different 
sophistication level. 
2- Literature review: 
In the past decade a number of research papers investigated the effectiveness of deposit 
insurance on risk control in banking sectors across different countries. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (1999) show empirical evidence  that explicit deposit insurance increases 
bank crisis in countries with weak regulatory institutions.  Similarly, Cull, Senbet, and 
Sorge (2000) argue that for explicit deposit insurance to sustain financial stability it has 
to be accompanied by a sound regulatory scheme. Kane (2000) explains that  the design 
of deposit insurance systems should incorporate that  country specific factors in 
particular, differences in informational environment and transparency and enforceability 
of regulations. Laeven (2002b) indicate that the opportunity cost of deposit insurance 
services is higher in countries with explicit deposit insurance as compared to countries 
without explicit deposit insurance. Matutes and Vives (1995) and Dewatripont and 
Tirole (1993a) indicate that the degree of moral hazard depends on whether the 
performance of the bank is observable. When bank performance is unobservable, risk 
taking behavior is maximized  even without deposit insurance. Matutes and Vives 
(1995), argue that if the performance of the bank are not observable, since depositors 
cannot differentiate between banks, they will charge interest rates that compensates them 
for maximum risk, and banks fulfill depositors expectation and assume maximum risk. 
3- Deposit insurance in Sudan: 
As part of policy package aiming to establish stable financial environment in the country 
the Central Bank  of  Sudan adopted in the past decade a number of policies, among 
which establishing Banks Deposit Security Fund (BDSF)  in 1996, with paid-up capital 
of  one hundred million Sudanese Dinars (equivalent to 40 million US$), in addition to 
annual fees of 0.03%  of total deposits of  each bank operating in the country payable to 
BDSF  as insurance premium. Currently, the annual insurance premium is flat rate 
applicable to all member banks, regardless of their risk levels. Table (1) includes 
summary of deposit insurance systems in Sudan and two other countries in the region for 
comparison purpose.  
To enhance  financial environment the Central Bank also implemented a policy of 
restructuring the banking sector, by raising banks capitalization, through implementation  
of optional and mandatory mergers between a number banks some of them were on the 
verge of financial collapse1. Since credit risk is the major source of financial risk in the 
banking sector in the country, the central bank’s regulation gave substantial space to 
credit risk control and monitoring. To reduce default risk the Central Bank stipulated a 
upper ceiling to bank loans at a level of 2.5% of the bank paid up capital to each single 
investor or borrower. To establish a comprehensive data base on bank loans the central 
bank adopted electronic code system that help monitoring the financial status of 
borrowers before any new loan transactions take place, and to help forming data base 
about NPLs of each bank. The Central bank also established Credit Rating Agency that 
help in disclosing financial transparency and credit worthiness of  borrowers of the 
banking sector. The Central Bank also set regulations about risk management 
departments in banks, corporate governance systems, as well as regulations related to 
organizing mortgage and asset valuation policies in the banking sector in the country. 
4- Methodology: 
4.1  Pricing deposit insurance: 
In the literature several methods have been developed to price deposit insurance. Many 
of these methods are based on Merton (1977) option pricing model that portrays deposit 
insurance as a put option on the bank’s assets, as indicated in the following 
specification: 
݌(݀,ߪଶ) = ߮(ℎଶ) − 1݀߮(ℎଵ) 
Where 
ℎଵ ≡ ቊlog(݀) − ߪଶ2 ቋ /ඥߪଶ 
                                                            
1 The merger of Gadaref bank with Saving bank was mandatory, but the mergers  of  Mashreq and Blue Nile banks, and 
Khartoum with Emirate bank were optional. 
ℎଶ ≡ ℎଵ + ඥߪଶ																				 
 
Where p is the price of deposit insurance per dollar of insured deposits, φ is the 
cumulative normal distribution function, d=D/v is the current deposit-to-asset value 
ratio, and σ2 is the variance of the logarithmic change in the value of the assets during 
the term of the deposits. This implies that as long as the deposit-to-asset ratio and the 
volatility of the assets remain fixed, the cost of deposit insurance is constant. 
4.2  Technical Efficiency : 
Several alternative DEA models have been employed in banks efficiency literature. In 
this paper we employed two alternative DEA models. We use the CCR (Charnes, 
Cooper, and Rohdes, 1978), and BCC (Banker, Charnes, and Cooper, 1984) models. The 
main objective of a DEA study is to project the inefficient decision making units (DMUs) 
onto the most efficient frontiers of the DMUs in the sample, under the assumptions of 
change in return to scale  and constant return to scale.  There are two directions, input-
oriented approach that aims at reducing the input amounts by as much as possible at a 
given level of output and the output-oriented, approach that maximizes output levels 
at a given input level.  
In vector-matrix notation the input-oriented CCR model, with a real variable  and a 
non-negative vector Tn ),..( 1    of variables can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
 
  (LP0)   min    (1) 
subject to 
 00   xx               (2) 
 0yY               (3) 
 0               (4) 
 
Where y0 and x0 are respectively the output and the input levels related to the specific 
DMU0 under investigation, and Y and X are matrices constituting all output and input 
variables. The objecƟve funcƟon in equaƟon (1) minimizes the input level, whereas the 
constraints in equaƟons (2) and (3) constrain the minimizaƟon of input within feasible 
region, and equaƟon (4) sƟpulates non-negativity constraint the input and output 
weights. 
The problem (LP0) has a feasible solution at =1, 10  , 0i (j0). Hence the opƟmal 
, denoted by *, is not greater than 1. On the other hand, due to the nonzero 
assumpƟon for the data (X and Y), the constraint (4) forces   to be nonzero because 
y0>0. Puƫng all this  together, we have 10 *   .  
The input-oriented BCC model evaluates the efficiency of DMU0 (0=1,...n) by  adding to 
the constraints in (2) – (4), the new constraint 1e , and solving for the minimum 
objecƟve funcƟon in equaƟon (1). 
When the BCC model is taken into account, the overall technical efficiency includes, the 
pure technical efficiency, which denoted as i , and the scale efficiency which is 
iii  / . Thus, the fraction of output lost due to scale inefficiency can be computed 
as )1( i . Scale inefficiency can arise due to variable (increasing or decreasing) return 
to scale. On the other hand, pure technical inefficiency occurs because a DMU uses 
more inputs than needed (input waste), whereas scale inefficiency occurs due to 
reasons that DMU is not operating at constant return to scale. To account for variable 
return to scale we employ BCC model, so that at scale efficiency 1*  , for both CCR 
and BCC models, but for 1 , for CCR, and 1*   for BCC, indication of scale 
inefficiency but pure technical efficiency. Pure technical inefficiency can be due to 
inefficient implementation of the production plan in converting inputs to outputs 
(managerial inefficiency). However scale inefficiency could be due to divergence of 
DMU from the most productive scale size. Therefore decomposing technical efficiency 
into pure technical and scale efficiencies allows us to gain insight into the main source 
of inefficiency in Sudanese banks.  
5- Empirical analysis: 
Data employed in this study taken from financial statements of 23 banks (foreign and 
local)  operating in the country during the  period  2010-2011. To estimate deposit 
insurance price based on Option pricing model, we  used total deposits and total assets – 
sum of  loans and cash-  as variables in the equations. Table (1) includes our estimation 
results which indicates that the flat rate of 0.3 percent of  the deposit insurance premium,  
under-value the insurance cost for about 14 banks among the 23 banks in the sample. 
Under-valued deposit insurance premium could induce moral hazard problem to the 
Deposit Security Fund and weaken its financial position. Table (2)  report the technical 
efficiency results that reveal operational risk measure and scale inefficiency. Results in 
table 2, indicates that the technically efficient banks in the group are three foreign banks: 
Sudani-Egyptian,  Almal, and Qatar bank, while almost all national banks below the 
efficiency level of the unit scale. 
  It is well documented that in countries with weak institutions and improper regulatory 
safeguards, explicit deposit insurance reduce incentives by depositors and shareholders 
to monitor their banks, and also give insured banks incentive to take additional risk as 
long as they can shift the added losses to deposit insurer2. This problem is known as 
moral hazard effect of deposit insurance. To test for moral hazard in the banking sector 
in this paper  we performed cross sectional regression analysis using two types of risks 
as dependent variables and deposit insurance coverage as independent variable. The first 
risk in our case is credit risk, as measured by non-performing loans for each bank during 
2011, whereas the second risk is the technical inefficiency risk measured by the  DEA,  
CCR model. Table (4) indicates estimation results that reveal a positive association, 
even though insignificant, between credit risk and deposit insurance coverage. This 
result imply the flat rate insurance premium policy employed by the Bank Deposit 
Security Fund (BDSF) instigates moral hazard effect at banks level, even though the 
effect is insignificant statistically. However, the influence of  deposit insurance on 
technical efficiency is negative, implying higher levels of insurance coverage decrease 
the efficiency of banks. In fact, the  result of negative association between coverage 
level and technical efficiency is consistent with the moral hazard behavior  associated 
with the positive association between insurance coverage and credit risk, because lower 
technical efficiency imply higher operational risk. As a result, both results support an 
evidence of correlation between moral hazard effect and  higher insurance coverage. The 
problem of insignificance of the coefficients of the independent variable in both cases is 
likely due to flat rate insurance premium that results in under priced insurance premium 
for a bout half of the number of banks in the sample3.  
 
                                                            
2 See Asli D., and Kane E., (2002). 
3 The insignificance problem of the coefficients could be resolved by including larger sample size of banks and run a 
separate regression on the group of banks with under-priced insurance premium. 
Table (1): Deposit insurance price 
Bank P Bank P 
Khartoum 0.002 Islamic-Sudanese 0.021 
Neleen 0.088 Savings 0.043 
Omdurman 0.008 Real estate 0.127 
Animal Resource 0.130 Abu-Dhabi 0.017 
Al-Shamal 0.022 Beblose 0.004 
Farmers 0.003 Sudanese-Egyptian 0.001 
Tadamon 0.003 AL-Salam 0.0003 
Fisal 0.0002 Industrial Dev. 0.110 
Sudanese-Saudi 0.131 Al-Mal 0.014 
French-Sudanese 0.020 Algazera 0.002 
Labors 0.001 Qatar 0.002 
Export 0.019   
P= insurance premium cost per a Sudanese pound in bank’s deposit. 
 
Table (2): Technical efficiency 
Bank CCR 
 
BCC 
 
Scale 
 
Bank CCR 
 
BCC 
 
Scale 
 
Khartoum 0.50 1.00 0.50 Islamic- 
Sudani 
0.56 0.56 1.00 
Neleen 0.92 0.96 0.95 Savings 0.47 0.50 0.94 
Omdurman 0.38 1.00 0.38 Real estate 0.82 1.00 0.82 
Animal  
Resource 
0.49 0.53 0.92 Abu-Dhabi 0.92 0.94 0.97 
Al-Shamal 0.45 0.47 0.95 Beblose 0.57 0.58 0.98 
Farmers 0.70 0.77 0.90 Sudani- 
Egyptian 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
Tadamon 0.51 0.77 0.66 AL-Salam 0.88 1.00 0.88 
Fisal 0.55 1.00 0.55 Industrial  
Dev. 
0.89 0.93 0.95 
Sudani- 
Saudi 
0.31 0.40 0.77 Al-Mal 1.00 1.00 1.00 
French- 
Sudani 
0.48 0.52 0.92 Algazera 0.64 1.00 0.64 
Labors 0.69 0.88 0.78 Qatar 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Export 0.81 0.82 0.98     
Notes:  
1- Scale efficiency computed as the ratio of CCR  to BCC . 
2- Efficiency results are based on 2011 data. 
 
 
Table (4): Moral hazard effects 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable 
(Deposit insurance) 
 
 
 
Credit risk 
∝଴ 
(p-value) 
∝ଵ 
(p-value) 
ܴଶ 
  LM 
0.001 
(0.98) 
0.035 
(0.77) 
0.04 
27.4 
 
 
Efficiency 
 
ߚ଴ 
(p-value) 
ߚଵ 
(p-value) 
ܴଶ 
    LM* 
0.69 
(0.00) 
- 0.072 
(0.39) 
0.035 
8.45 
*LM test for cross section heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
 
 
 
6- Concluding remarks: 
To price deposit insurance  premium and  assess moral hazard behavior in the banking 
sector in Sudan we used financial data for 23 banks, national and foreign banks, 
operating in the country in 2011. We applied Merton (1977) options pricing model to 
price deposit insurance premium .To assess moral hazard effect we estimated two types 
of risks, credit default risk, measured as the ratio of non-performing loans to the total 
size of loans for each bank, and operational risk measured as technical inefficiency 
estimated using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Our findings indicate that there is a 
positive association between insurance coverage premium and  increase in each of these 
two risks. The results of positive association between insurance coverage and the two 
risks imply evidence of moral hazard effect. A policy implication of this result is that the 
moral hazard behavior in the banking sector can be mitigated by changing the flat rate 
deposit insurance premium policy currently practiced into risk based insurance premium 
policy. 
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Appendix: Deposit Insurance Systems 
 Sudan Law Bahrain Law Jordan Law 
Board of 
Directors 
 
1- The Governor of  the 
Central Bank. 
2- The General Manager 
of  the deposit 
insurance fund 
3- Deputy Minister of 
Finance & National 
Economy 
4- Director of the 
department of banks 
regulation at the 
Central Bank. 
5- Two members elected 
by the Association of 
commercial banks 
6- Two experts in banking 
chosen by the Minister 
of Finance & National 
Economy 
1- Two experts  
nominated by the 
Governor  of the 
Monetary Agency 
2- Four members 
representing 
commercial banks 
nominated by the 
Governor of the 
Monetary Agency 
3- A representative 
from each of: 
Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry 
of Justice and 
Islamic Affairs, 
Ministry of 
National Economy 
and Trade. 
4- A representative 
from a bank under 
liquidation. 
 
1- Governor of the Central 
Bank (Chair) 
2- Deputy Governor of the 
Central Bank 
3- The General Manager of 
the Deposit Insurance 
Fund 
4- Two members from the 
Ministry of Finance, 
and the Ministry of 
Trade 
5- Two members 
appointed by the 
Council of Ministers. 
Membership All licensed commercial banks 
operating in the country. 
All licensed commercial 
banks operating in the 
country except those 
insured elsewhere  outside 
the country. 
All commercial banks operating 
in the country, with exception of 
branches of Jordanian banks 
operating outside the country. 
Annual fees Insured member pay annual fee 
of the rate 0.003 of its total 
current and saving accounts. 
And also 0.003 of its total 
investment account. 
Annual fee of 25 million 
Dinars divided between 
insured banks, based on  
proportion of each bank’s 
deposits. 
Annual fee of 0.0025 of the total 
insured deposits, and possibly a 
higher rate for banks with 
higher risks, or when under 
liquidation. 
Initial paid-
up capital 
1- 25 Million Sudanese 
Dinars paid by the 
Ministry of Finance 
2- 40 Million Dinars by 
the Central Bank 
3- 1 Million Dinars by 
each member bank. 
No initial capital payment . 1- One Million Jordanian 
Dinars paid by the 
Government 
2- 100,000 Dinars paid by 
banks as initial capital 
fees. 
 
 
 
